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This paper examines the impact of labour and product market reforms on sectoral employment 
and productivity, following a difference-in-differences approach. Using industry-level data for 
the period 1997-2013, we show that employment protection deregulation has a positive effect 
on the growth rate of employment, for industries more exposed to labour market legislation, 
despite not having any impact on productivity. Upstream product market deregulation increases 
sectoral employment growth, especially for the more exposed downstream sectors. 
Nevertheless, it has mixed effects on sectoral productivity growth: while upstream sectors face 
productivity losses (as only the most efficient firms are able to thrive), the downstream sectors, 
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1. Introduction  
Recent decades have seen a surge in the calls for product and labour market reforms: “Product  
and labour market reforms are needed to lift persistently sluggish growth in advanced 
economies” – as summarized in one of the latest IMF Staff Discussion Notes (Banerji et al., 
2017). Such reforms have been prescribed for Portugal as a growth-promoting tool, particularly 
after the sovereign debt and economic crisis and the adjustment programme that ensued 
(European Commission, 2014; OECD, 2014), leading the country to one of the most ambitious 
plan of structural reforms amongst developed countries (OECD, 2014; Koske, I. et al., 2015; 
see Figure 1). In the labour market, employment protection legislation reforms included cuts in 
severance pay; inclusion of further reasons for dismissal based on inadaptability; and 
performance-based criteria for dismissals in the case of extinction of the work position (OECD, 
2017). The product market has also seen significant developments with: product and service 
markets liberalization (covering both networks and professional services), enhancement of the 
competition framework and improvements in the enforcement (European Commission, 2016; 
OECD, 2013a; 2014); in a context of reforms improving framework conditions (e.g. judicial 
system, business environment, etc.).  
Figure 1 – Evolution of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) and Upstream Product Market Regulation (PMR) in 
OECD countries 
 
Source: Own calculations, based on OECD Indicators of Employment Protection Legislation and OECD Indicators of Product 
Market Regulation. These indicators take the minimum value of 0 and progress to a value of 6 for maximal regulation. 
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We take advantage of these recent developments to assess the effects of product and labour 
market deregulation on employment and productivity outcomes, at sectoral level, for the case 
of Portugal.1 This strategy allows us to obtain the marginal effect of the regulatory indicators 
in the sectors of the Portuguese economy, taking into account the idiosyncratic conditions of 
the country – whereas cross-country estimated parameters are assumed to be the same 
throughout a panel of countries, in spite of these having different underlying economic 
structures.2 Industry-level analysis also has advantages vis-à-vis (non-weighted) firm-level 
analysis, since the impact of a reform on the average firm does not necessarily carry over to its 
corresponding sector, as a whole.  
We show that employment protection deregulation has a positive effect on the growth rate of 
employment, for industries more exposed to labour market legislation, despite not having any 
impact on productivity. However, by drilling down from sectoral to firm-level data, we show 
that the absence of aggregate sectoral effects disguises composition effects across firms, with 
winners and losers. 
In addition, we show that product market deregulation, in upstream sectors, promotes overall 
employment growth - for the industries more exposed to the deregulated sectors. Particularly, 
the downstream sectors experience an increase in employment growth greater than the overall 
sectoral increase.3  Concerning productivity, whilst the deregulated upstream sectors are found 
to suffer losses, the downstream sectors (more exposed to the deregulated ones) grasp 
                                                 
1Importantly, this study results from a partnership between the Office for Economic Policy and International 
Affairs (GPEARI) of the Portuguese Ministry of Finance and Nova School of Business and Economics. The 
GPEARI is particularly interested in these sectoral effects on the Portuguese economy, given the lack of industry-
level studies focusing on the Portuguese economy.  
2 It is worth noting the existence of a trade-off. Cross-country sectoral data necessarily increases the sample 
variation in opposition of exclusively considering national sectoral data.  
3 Downstream sectors, also designated in the literature as “manufacturing industries”, are the sectors that use 
intermediate inputs produced by the upstream sectors (or “non-manufacturing industries”). The latter sectors herein 
considered are: networks, retail distribution and professional services.  
5 
   
productivity gains. The analysis is complemented by further exploring the heterogeneous firm-
level impact of product market deregulation on productivity. For upstream industries (and 
considering firms with relatively high exposure), we find evidence that only firms with higher 
productivity growth are able to thrive in a more competitive upstream environment. Conversely, 
the indirect impact on downstream industries is broad-based, with gains occurring 
independently of the initial productivity growth of the firm.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature, Section 3 presents 
the methodology, and Section 4 describes the datasets and the variables used. The results are 
presented in Section 5 and, finally, Section 6 provides the conclusion and lays a foundation for 
future work.  
2. Literature Review 
 
This section reviews the quantitative evidence on the effects of product and labour market 
deregulation on productivity and employment.  
i) Labour market deregulation 
While some studies argue that stringent labour market regulation curbs productivity (OECD, 
2007; Bassanini et al., 2009; Cingano et al., 2010), others find productivity gains from 
employment regulation (Acharya et al., 2013; Gouveia et al., 2017a). 
Concerning the effect on employment, OECD (2016) provides industry-level evidence of short-
run employment losses caused by easing Employment Protection Legislation (EPL), which are 
then reverted in the long-run. Indeed, most authors find evidence of EPL’s negative sectoral 
effect on employment, namely in labour intensive industries (Ahsan and Pagés, 2009) and in 
industries that have high job reallocation rates, particularly due to a reduction in the net entry 
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of firms (Pagés and Micco, 2007). There are also cross-country studies, with aggregate-level 
data, establishing a link between regulation and higher unemployment (Scarpetta, 1996; La 
Porta et al., 2004).  
ii) Product market deregulation 
Upstream product market deregulation has been found to foster aggregate and sectoral-level 
long-run employment for downstream industries that are more dependent on the intermediate 
inputs provided by upstream sectors (OECD, 2016). This effect is explained by a competition 
channel which decreases downstream input prices, increases its quality, and eliminates the 
regulatory-induced competitive disadvantage of downstream sectors when negotiating 
contracts and prices with upstream ones (Bourlès et al., 2010).  Product market deregulation 
has also been linked with positive aggregate employment effects, that strengthen over time, 
particularly when labour market regulations are stringent (Fiori et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
Bassanini (2015) finds evidence of revertible employment short-run losses in upstream sectors, 
mainly through downsizing.  
Several papers establish a positive link between pro-competitive upstream product market 
reforms and downstream productivity, using both firm-level (Arnold et al., 2011; Forlani, 
2012; Gal and Hijzen, 2016; Topalova and Lanau, 2016) and sectoral-level data (Bourlès et. 
al., 2010, 2013; Barone and Cingano, 2011). However, while some authors argue that reforms 
have greater returns the closer an economy is to the technological frontier (Arnold et al., 2008; 
Acemoglu et al., 2003, 2006; Vandenbussche et al., 2006), others show that gains increase 
with the distance to the frontier (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003; Gouveia et al., 2017a; Gouveia 
et al, 2017b). Bourlès et al., (2013) also find evidence of heterogeneous effects, showing that 
deregulation boosts the returns to innovation for the most productive firms but reduces the 
innovation incentives for the least productive.  
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Amable et al. (2016) argue that deregulation curbs innovation in upstream sectors, which 
trickles down to downstream sectors, hindering productivity growth.  
3. Methodology 
Our baseline regression evaluates the effect of product and labour market regulatory indicators 
on two outcomes – employment and productivity – by comparing industries with different 
exposures to regulation. The fundamental reasoning behind this specification is that the intrinsic 
nature of an industry makes it more or less affected by regulation. In other words, the degree 
whereby a sector is exposed to regulation determines how binding regulation is for that sector, 
thus allowing us to perform a difference-in-differences analysis. Following the literature, we 
consider that sectors with higher layoffs are more exposed to labour market regulation (e.g. 
Bassanini et al., 2009), while those that use higher shares of upstream-sector inputs are more 
exposed to product market regulation (e.g. Bourlès et. al., 2010).  
We thus implement the difference-in-differences specification of Bassanini et al. (2009), who 
specify the expected pairwise-difference between any two sectors (𝑘 and ℎ) as: 
𝐸(∆ log 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑘,𝑡 − ∆ log 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒ℎ,𝑡) = (𝑓( 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑘) − 𝑓( 𝐸𝑥𝑝ℎ))𝑔(𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑡−1, ∆𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑡) [1] 
, where 𝑓(. ) is a non-negative and non-decreasing function. 
Letting 𝑔(. ) be linear, and 𝑓(. )  the identity function, we can re-write [1] as: 
𝐸(∆ log 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑘,𝑡) − 𝐸(∆ log 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒ℎ,𝑡) = 𝛽𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑡−1( 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑘 −  𝐸𝑥𝑝ℎ) +
𝛿∆𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑡( 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑘 −  𝐸𝑥𝑝ℎ) + (𝛾𝑘 − 𝛾ℎ) [2]  
Hence, for industry 𝑗, the expected growth of the outcome variable can be expressed as: 
  E(∆𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑗,𝑡) =    𝛽𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑗  𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑗  ∆𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + µ𝑡  [3]  
, where µ𝑡 captures sector-invariant effects. In this setting, the growth of the outcome variable 
for industry 𝑗 can be estimated by the following specification, which is our baseline regression: 
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∆𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑗,𝑡 =    𝛽𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑗  𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑗  ∆𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑡 + 𝜃𝑗 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑗𝑡 [4] 
, where 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑗,𝑡 stands for productivity or employment variables of industry j in year t 
(depending on the specification), 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑗  denotes the exposure to the regulatory variable for 
industry j, and 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑡 stands for product or labour market regulation at time t (depending on the 
specification). Furthermore 𝜃𝑗  and 𝜃𝑡 are industry and time fixed effects, respectively. 
The intuition for the difference-in-differences approach, that we follow, can be easily seen by 
focusing on a particular case of equation [4], whereby the treatment is defined by an indicator 
variable which identifies industries as being entirely regulation-binding (treatment group), if 
their exposure is greater than a certain threshold.4 In this binary setting (as opposed to our 
continuous one), the estimated coefficients provide us with the difference between treatment 
and control groups. In the continuous case we follow, we have the difference between two 
industries which are one percentage point apart in terms of exposure, hence our coefficient gives 
us the impact of “treatment” intensity. Indeed, as pointed out by Bassanini et al., (2009), it is 
more plausible that the extent to which an industry is affected by regulation depends on a 
continuous variable (such as our exposure variable).  
Overall, it is important to note that 𝛽 measures the growth-effect, i.e. the permanent impact of 
the regulatory variable on the growth rate of the outcome variable (as the corresponding 
explanatory variable is specified as a level variable, while the response variable is specified as 
a growth variable); 𝛿 captures the level-effect i.e. the permanent level-impact of deregulation 
(as both the explanatory and the dependent variable are expressed as growth variables). 
However, as emphasized by Bassanini et al., (2009), some level-effects may not be captured by 
                                                 
4 See Bassanini et al (2009), Appendix 2, p.16, for a derivation of the discrete case. 
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𝛿 if they take too much time to materialize; additionally, a level effect which only materializes 
in the very long-term may be taken, in our model, by a permanent growth effect.  
For the firm-level analysis (standard and quantile regressions), we maintain specification [4], 
with the exception of allowing the outcome variable to be firm-specific. 
4  Data  
4.1. Dataset 
We use annual sectoral-level data from the Portuguese National Accounts (ESA2010), 
compiled by INE – Instituto Nacional de Estatística (Statistics Portugal). The time frame 
considered is restricted by the available regulatory indicator variables of choice – sourced from 
OECD - which only covers the 1997-2013 period.  We consider the sectors whereby, for the 
relevant timeframe, a suitable matching could be performed between the 2-digit ISIC Rev.3 
aggregation (followed by OECD, for the regulatory indexes) and the 2-digit CAE Rev.3 
(followed by the Portuguese National Accounts), excluding sectors more prone to measurement 
error or with an unavailable correspondent exposure indicator.5 These corrections decrease our 
sectoral dataset from 306 to 288 observations in the employment protection analysis, and from 
612 to 576 or 496 (depending on the specifications) for the product market regulation case.  
Additionally, for the purposes of testing the robustness of our sectoral-level analysis and to 
explore the heterogeneous effect of upstream deregulation on productivity growth, we conduct 
a firm-level analysis, using the IES - Informação Empresarial Simplificada (Simplified 
Corporate Information) database, provided by Bank of Portugal. This database encompasses 
annual accounting data for all Portuguese firms. The initial dataset has 3,840,634 observations 
                                                 




   
for the period 2006-2015. In order to increase the reliability of our estimates, we exclude firms 
which report a negative or nil amount of assets, liabilities, costs, turnover, worked hours, 
employees and value added. Likewise, we restrict the data for the period 2006-2013, due to the 
regulatory indicators’ availability. Furthermore, we consider the same sectors as for the 
correspondent industry-level regression, for consistency purposes. This leads us to 600,466 
observations for the firm-level analysis and 119,535 for the quantile regression one.   
4.2. Variables  
This section outlines the various variables used throughout our analysis.  
As stated in Section 3, we measure regulatory stringency of the labour market through the 
OECD indicator of Employment Protection Legislation, a measure of the incurred costs and 
procedures associated with the dismissal and hiring of employees. This measure is partitioned 
into three sub-indicators: EPR, an index of regulatory strictness concerning individual dismissal 
of workers on regular contracts; EPT, which measures the degree of regulation for temporary 
contracts; and EPRC, comprising a weighted sum of both individual and collective dismissal 
sub-indicators.6 These regulatory indicators range from 0 (no regulation) to 6 (maximum 
stringency).  
We follow Bassanini et al., (2009) and Jain-Chandra and Zhang (2014), and use the layoff rate 
for the United States for the period 2001-03 as a measure of exposure to labour market 
regulations, computed by Bassanini et al., (2009), based on the 2004 Displaced Workers 
Supplement data. The rationale is that industries which are more prone to adjust to shocks in 
demand and supply through layoffs are more affected by regulation that determines their ability 
to adjust through this same mean. The US is the OECD country with the lowest level of 
                                                 
6 EPRC attributes a weight of 2/7 for additional provisions for collective dismissals and 5/7 to individual dismissals 
(regular contracts). For additional details on these indicators please refer to chapter 2 of OECD (2013d). 
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employment protection legislation, thus serving as a de facto proxy that captures any given 
industry’s “natural” layoff rate in the absence of regulation. By using the US layoff rate, we 
avoid endogeneity issues related with using the Portuguese layoff rate, as this national value 
could be determined by the prevailing level of regulation in the labour market. 
For the effects of product market deregulation on downstream industries, we rely on the 
regulatory impact indicator (Regimpact), computed by the OECD.7 This indicator incorporates 
the OECD regulatory indices for upstream sectors, i.e. networks, retail distribution and 
professional services (a narrow version of this indicator, only encompassing networks is used 
for robustness checks), which are then weighted by an industry-specific exposure variable. The 
exposure variable is computed using the input-output matrices, ascertaining the weight of 
upstream sector industries on the input usage of the different sectors. The intuition is that a 
sector which uses a higher amount of inputs from the upstream industries is more vulnerable to 
regulation in those sectors. Similarly to the layoff rate, we use input-output coefficient from the 
correspondent US industry, to avoid endogeneity issues. The OECD regulatory impact 
indicator, Regimpact, takes value 0 for unaffected downstream sectors due to upstream 
regulation, and 1 for the highly-affected ones. 
The outcome variables are: worked hours (HoursWorked), as a baseline for employment, with 
the number of employees (Employees) being used for robustness checks. Our measure of 
productivity is labour productivity, determined with the ratio of gross value added (GVA) to 
worked hours (HoursWorked). Output is used instead of gross value added, when available, for 
assessing the robustness of the results.  
                                                 
7 For additional details on the indicator please refer to Égert and Wanner (2016). 
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Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the various sectoral and firm-level samples used 
in the different specifications: 
 
Source: Own computations using INE, IES, OECD and Displaced Workers Supplement data, for the above-mentioned 
periods.  
5. Empirical Results and Robustness Checks 
In this section, we present the estimation results for specification [4], adapting it in accordance 
to the outcomes and regulatory indicators of choice.8 
 
                                                 
8 Whenever applicable, time fixed effects are included, as to control for unobserved macroeconomic shocks. We 
also control for industry-specific demand dynamics: given that the baseline specification is estimated by a fixed 
effects models and based on first differences, sectoral fixed effects are implicitly being accounted for, and thus not 
included in the regressions; with the forthcoming quantile regression being the exception, where fixed effects were 
not included due to insufficient sample variation.   
Variables (Sectoral-Level PMR) 1997-2013 Unit Mean Std Dev Min. Max.
Wide Indicator (US) unit 0.14 0.15 0.02 0.81
Narrow Indicator (US) unit 0.07 0.12 0.01 0.80
Gross Value Added 106 € 4,160.00 4,832.00 191.00 22,220.00
Total Output 106 € 9,008.00 8,513.00 311.00 43,830.00
Hours Worked 106 204.00 255.00 3.00 1,313.00
Employees 103 133.00 169.00 2.00 757.00
Variables (Sectoral-Level EPL) 1997-2013 Unit Mean Std Dev Min. Max.
US Layoff Rate unit 5.18 1.35 2.83 8.12
EPR - Regular Contracts unit 4.33 0.38 3.18 4.58
EPT - Temporary Contracts unit 2.44 0.40 1.81 2.81
EPRC - Individual and Collective Dismissals unit 3.79 0.39 2.81 4.10
Gross Value Added 106 € 3,946.00 5,019.00 191.00 22,220.00
Total Output 106 € 10,814.00 10,287.00 651.00 43,830.00
Hours Worked 106 242.00 313.00 3.00 1,313.00
Employees 103 140.00 184.00 2.00 757.00
Variables (Firm-Level EPL) 2006-2013 Unit Mean Std Dev Min. Max.
US Layoff Rate unit 4.40 1.22 2.83 8.12
EPR - Regular Contracts unit 4.11 0.43 3.18 4.58
EPT - Temporary Contracts unit 2.09 0.29 1.81 2.81
EPRC - Individual and Collective Dismissals unit 3.54 0.38 2.81 4.10
Gross Value Added 103 € 582.00 7,711.00 0.00 1,190,000.00
Hours Worked 103 34.00 239.00 0.00 38,000.00
Employees unit 18.00 127.00 1.00 22,734.00
Variables (Firm-Level PMR) 2008-2009 Unit Mean Std Dev Min. Max.
Wide Indicator (US) unit 0.22 0.20 0.02 0.53
Narrow Indicator (US) unit 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.45
Gross Value Added 103 € 580.00 7,697.00 0.00 1,190,000.00
Hours Worked 103 34.00 239.00 0.00 38,000.00
Employees unit 19.00 139.00 1.00 22,734.00
Table 1 –  Descriptive Statistics 
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5.1 Sectoral-Level Impact of Labour Market Regulation 
The results, presented in Table 2, show evidence of a negative link between employment 
protection legislation and employment growth, in industries that are “naturally” more affected 
by such legislation. Hence, these industries will tend to increase the rate at which they hire 
employees as a consequence of deregulation, in comparison to those less exposed to regulation.  
A likely explanation is that industries more prone to adjust to market shocks through hirings 
and layoffs have a higher latent labour demand than the one displayed under tight regulation. 
Therefore, if regulation hinders their ability to adjust, they are cautious to hire due to 
uncertainty, implying less efficient production outcomes, as they are less responsive to market 
changes. With deregulatory reform, these sectors are able to increase net hirings, with net 
benefits arising from increased flexibility. This result is robust to the usage of the variation in 
the number of employees as measure of employment growth.  
Table 2 – Impact of Employment Protection Legislation on Sector-Level Employment 
 
Source: Own computations, using INE and OECD data for the years 1997-2013. 
Concerning the effects on productivity, the results presented in Table 3 suggest a lack of robust 
response of productivity to employment protection legislation, as there are no differences 
between regulation-exposed sectors and the others. Indeed, there are only two single significant 
and weakly significant effects for the cases of the indicators for temporary contracts (EPT) and 
of stringency ruling individual and collective dismissals (EPRC), but that fail to be robust to 
changes in the outcome variable of labour productivity.  
Variables ΔHoursWorked ΔEmployees ΔHoursWorked ΔEmployees ΔHoursWorked ΔEmployees
EPRt-1 -0.02** -0.02** - - - -
ΔEPR -0.01 0.00 - - - -
EPTt-1 - -  -0.02**  -0.01** - -
ΔEPT - - -0.01 -0.01 - -
EPRCt-1 - - - - -0.02** -0.02** 
ΔEPRC - - - - -0.01 -0.01
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 288 288 288 288 270 270
Overall R
2
5% 5% 9% 10% 5% 6%
Notes: Variations in the number of observations are due to data availability. Results were estimated using robust standard errors.  ***: 
significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level.
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Table 3 – Impact of Employment Protection Legislation on Sector-Level Productivity 
 
Source: Own computations, using INE and OECD data for the years 1997-2013. 
 
To further understand the lack of response of productivity, we extend the analysis to firm-level 
data (Table 4), showing that, despite no aggregate sectoral effects, there are composition effects 
that cancel out at sectoral level. Indeed, for the average firm, deregulation has a positive effect 
on productivity, the higher the exposure to regulation.9 
Table 4 – Impact of Employment Protection Legislation on Firm-Level Productivity 
 
Source: Own computations, using IES and OECD data for the years 2006-2013. 
These results are robust to the usage of GVA/Employees as measure of labour productivity.  
 5.2. Sectoral-Level Impact of Product Market Regulation  
Competitive-enhancing upstream reforms are estimated to have a positive impact on 
employment growth, for industries that depend relatively more on upstream intermediate inputs, 
and consequently are more affected by upstream product market regulation (Table 5). A 
                                                 





















EPRt-1 0.06 0.02 - - - -
ΔEPR -0.04 0.01 - - - -
EPTt-1 - - 0.02 0.02** - -
ΔEPT - - -0.00 0.00 - -
EPRCt-1 - - - - 0.05* 0.02
ΔEPRC - - - - -0.06 0.00
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 288.00 288.00 288.00 288.00 270.00 270.00
Overall R
2
0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.10
Notes: Variations in the number of observations are due to data availability. Results were estimated using robust standard errors.  ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: 




















EPRt-1 -0.01*** -0.00*** - - - -
ΔEPR -0.02*** -0.02*** - - - -
EPTt-1 - - 0.00 0.01*** - -
ΔEPT - - 0.00 -0.00 - -
EPRCt-1 - - - - -0.01*** -0.00**
ΔEPRC - - - - -0.02*** -0.02***
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 600,466.00 599,558.00 600,466.00 599,558.00 600,466.00 599,558.00
Overall R
2
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
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straightforward reasoning is that lower upstream regulation pressures upstream sectors to 
reduce prices and to increase the quality of their services, via increased competition and reduced 
negotiation-edge vis-à-vis downstream clients, which fosters downstream growth and allows 
downstream sectors to channel resources towards further hirings.  
Despite the non-negligible increase in overall employment growth, the effect is stronger in 
downstream sectors (Table 6), most likely since upstream industries have two opposing forces 
at work, whilst competition may lead to a downsizing of incumbents, firm entry is promoted by 
upstream deregulation.10 The results are robust to the usage of employees as employment 
variable. 
Table 5 - Impact of Upstream Product Market Deregulation on Sector-Level Employment 
 
Source: Own computations, using INE and OECD data for the years 1997-2013. 
Table 6 - Impact of Upstream Product Market Deregulation on Downstream Sector-Level Employment 
 
Source: Own computations, using INE and OECD data for the years 1997-2013. 
Turning to the impact on productivity, we find that an upstream deregulatory process dampens 
labour productivity growth for industries with a relative high-exposure to upstream regulation, 
                                                 
10 Since the regulatory indicator is also capturing the effect upstream deregulation has on the upstream sector 
(direct effect of deregulation), we exclude the upstream industries of professional services, retail distribution and 
network from our sample and re-estimate the regression, using the wide Regimpact, in order to exclusively capture 
the indirect effects of upstream deregulation (on downstream sectors). 
Variable ΔHoursWorked ΔEmployees ΔHoursWorked ΔEmployees
Regimpactt-1 (wide) -0.11*** -0.10*** - -
ΔRegimpact(wide) -0.07 -0.06 - -
Regimpactt-1 (narrow) - - -0.11*** -0.10***
ΔRegimpact(narrow) - - -0.12 -0.10
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
N 576.00 576.00 576.00 576.00
Overall R
2
9% 6% 11% 10%
Notes: Variations in the number of observations are due to data availability. Results were estimated using robust standard 
errors.  ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level.
Variable ΔHoursWorked ΔEmployees
Regimpactt-1 (wide) -0.19 -0.40**
ΔRegimpact(wide) -0.61** -0.68**





Notes: Results were estimated using robust standard errors.  ***: significant at 1% 
level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level.
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in comparison to the remainder industries (Table 7). This result is robust to the usage of the 
narrow indicator and to the usage of Output for the computation of labor productivity, instead 
of the baseline variables.  
Table 7 - Impact of Upstream Product Market Deregulation on Sector-Level Productivity 
 
Source: Own computations, using INE and OECD data for the years 1997-2013. 
Table 8 clarifies this outcome.  Indeed, we find that there are productivity gains for downstream 
industries but not for the deregulated sectors themselves, which are hampered by increased 
competition and lower incentives to innovation (due to reduced mark-ups). The downstream 
sectors are likely to see their input costs going down and to gain better access to upstream 
services, thus allowing them to increase the efficiency of their productive process and to 
channel resources towards productivity-enhancing technology. Moreover, the result is robust to 
the below represented variation in the measure of productivity growth. 
Table 8 -  Impact of Upstream Product Market Deregulation on Downstream Sector-Level Productivity 
 
Source: Own computations, using INE and OECD data for the years 1997-2013. 
 
Furthermore, and given that some authors argue that the impact of reforms is mediated by firm-
level productivity (e.g. Arnold et al., 2008; Gouveia et al., 2017a), we complement our analysis 
by assessing whether there are heterogeneous effects across firms with different productivity 
growth rates, which are concurring to our aggregate sectoral result. To do so, we estimate a 
Variable Δ LP = GVA/HoursWorked Δ LP = Output/HoursWorked Δ LP = GVA/HoursWorked Δ LP = Output/HoursWorked
Regimpactt-1 (wide) 0.14** 0.18*** - -
ΔRegimpact(wide) 0.18 -0.07 - -
Regimpactt-1 (narrow) - - 0.18** 0.19*
ΔRegimpact(narrow) - - 0.22 -0.04
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
N 576.00 576.00 576.00 576.00
Overall R
2
2% 11% 2% 15%
Notes: Variations in the number of observations are due to data availability. Results were estimated using robust standard errors.  ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: 
significant at 10% level.
Variable Δ LP = GVA/HoursWorked Δ LP = GVA/Employees
Regimpactt-1 (wide) -0.58*** -0.38**
ΔRegimpact(wide) -0.27 -0.19





Notes: Results were estimated using robust standard errors.  ***: significant 
at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level.
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firm-level quantile regression.11 As, within our time frame, upstream product market regulation 
mostly changed between 2008-2009 (Figure 2), we restrict our quantile regression firm-level 
analysis to this period.12 
Figure 2 – Growth of Upstream Product Market Regulation in Portugal 
 
Source: Own computations, using OECD indicators of Product Market Regulation for the years 2006-2013. 
Figure 3 illustrates how the OLS estimates fail to grasp the whole picture of the deregulatory 
growth-effect on productivity (left-hand side panel), and only succeeds at doing so for the level-
effects (right-hand side panel). The former quantile regression curve (in the left panel) sheds 
light on how the estimated coefficients vary along the conditional distribution of the 
productivity growth rate. 
                                                 
11 A firm-level analysis is performed due to lack of sector-level sample variation for this approach.  
 
12 Panel quantile regression has numerous caveats associated with it. Moreover, firms are expected to change 
quantiles across time, so we opt for this parsimonious approach. 
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Figure 3 -  Impact of Upstream Product Market Deregulation on Firm-Level Productivity 
 
Notes: The vertical axis display the marginal impact of one unit change per quantile (on the horizontal axis), for comparison 
purposes the OLS estimates and the respective confidence intervals are also presented, as the horizontal dashed lines. The 
shadowed area surrounding the quantile regression curves represents its 95% confidence interval. 
Source: Own computations, using IES and OECD data for the years 2008-2009.  
 
The estimation, using the baseline measure of productivity growth, shows (Table 9) that firms 
with low levels of productivity growth (at the lower quantiles), experience a detrimental effect 
of upstream product market deregulation on productivity growth (considering firms with a 
higher exposure relatively to firms with lower exposure). Nevertheless, for firms with higher 
productivity growth rates, (at upper quantiles) deregulation becomes beneficial.  
Table 9 -  Impact of Upstream Product Market Deregulation on Firm-Level Productivity 
 
Source: Own computations, using IES and OECD data for the years 2008-2009 
Similarly to the previous analyses, we exclude the upstream industries, in order to assess 
whether these results are being influenced by the direct effects on deregulated sectors.  
              Δ LP Quantiles
Variables
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Regimpactt-1 (wide) 0.23*** 0.09*** -0.01** -0.10*** -0.28***
ΔRegimpact(wide) 0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.04 -0.08
N 119,535 119,535 119,535 119,535 119,535
Pseudo R
2
0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Notes:  Industry fixed effects were not included due to insufficient sample variation; ***: significant 
at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level.
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The estimated results (Table 10) suggest that the inequitable effects of deregulation on 
productivity growth are determined solely by the upstream direct effects of regulation; in this 
vein, upstream product market deregulation has a rather homogeneous positive effect on 
productivity growth for downstream firms, regardless of their relative productivity growth 
(their position along the quantile distribution) 
Table 10 - Impact of Upstream Product Market Deregulation on Downstream Firm-Level Productivity 
 
Source: Own computations, using IES and OECD data for the years 2008-2009 
6. Conclusion and Future Directions 
Recent years have seen a surge in the demand for product and labour market deregulation alike. 
Portugal has been in the forefront of this matter, having undertaken an ambitious reform 
programme, in the midst of sluggish economic growth and persistent economic imbalances. 
Empirical evidence on the aggregate sectoral impact of structural reforms, taking into account 
the specificities of the Portuguese economy, is therefore vital from a policy maker’s standpoint, 
in order to sharpen the design and implementation of such reforms and to complement the 
existing firm-level and cross-country evidence. Furthermore, literature shows that information 
is crucial for the ownership of any reform process (Boeri and Tabellini, 2012; Gouveia et al., 
2017a). 
In this context, we use sectoral-level data for the periods 1997-2013 to evaluate the impact of 
labour and product market reforms on employment and productivity growth, following a 
              Δ LP Quantiles
Variables
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Regimpactt-1 (wide) -0.28*** -0.32*** -0.19*** -0.17*** -0.32***
ΔRegimpact(wide) 0.16 -0.20* -0.08 -0.15* -0.12
N 75,684 75,684 75,684 75,684 75,684
Pseudo R
2
0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Notes:  Industry fixed effects were not included due to insufficient sample variation; ***: significant 
at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level.
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difference-in-differences approach. Where needed, we complement our analysis with firm-level 
data (available from 2006 onwards) in order to shed light on the effects at play. 
The empirical results suggest overall benefits from deregulatory processes, both in terms of 
employment and productivity, with some qualifications nonetheless.  
Concerning labour market reforms, and in line with the findings of OECD (2016) and Pagés 
and Micco (2007), our results suggest that decreasing the costs associated with hirings and 
dismissals fosters the employment growth rate, for industries more exposed to labour market 
regulations (proxied by the industry’s “natural” job turnover). In addition, while we do not find 
any sectoral-effect on productivity we show, relying on firm-level data, that there are gainers 
and losers, which resonates with the asymmetric effects found in the literature, with evidence 
of productivity gains and productivity losses. Our firm-level analysis points to positive effects 
for the average firm, which is small and has low productivity. This corroborates the results of 
Gouveia et al., (2017a), showing that only the least productive firms are able to grasp 
productivity gains from reduced employment protection legislation. 
In respect to product market reforms, upstream deregulation is found to foster employment 
growth for the sectors with relatively high degree of exposure to upstream inputs, matching the 
findings of OECD (2016). Additionally, our results show that downstream industries see their 
productivity growth increase with upstream product market deregulation, similarly to the 
findings of Barone and Cingano (2011) and Bourlès et. al., (2010; 2013). Conversely, and as 
argued by Amable et al., (2016), we find evidence that upstream sectors face productivity 
losses, possible due to reduced incentives to innovate (via reduced mark-ups). Our quantile 
regression sheds further light on this result, showing that there are important composition 
effects in upstream industries – while firms with high relative exposure, that experience higher 
21 
   
productivity growth rates are able to grasp additional productivity gains, when faced with a 
more competitive environment, the ones at the bottom of the distribution face lower 
productivity growth.  
Our analysis could be enlarged in a number of ways. In particular, the analysis of employment 
outcomes focuses on quantity of overall employment. It would be interesting to consider the 
effects on full-time and part-time employment and on permanent and temporary contracts as 
changes in regulation may have heterogeneous effects. Also, we do not account for the impact 
on the quality of employment, which is also a key element for policy assessment as deregulation 
may induce less stable employment relations and an erosion of workers’ rights, with important 
equity considerations. Furthermore, we do not account for interactions among reforms or for 
the initial regulatory stance. However, the impact of changes in regulation may be non-linear 
and may depend on the existing level of regulation, which is important for the sequencing and 
packaging of reforms. Furthermore, we consider that the effects are symmetric, i.e. that 
loosening and tightening regulation has a comparable effect, which is not necessarily the case.  
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Appendix – Box 1 
 
Sectors Considered for the Employment Protection Legislation analysis: 
Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products; Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel and leather products; 
Manufacture of wood and paper products, and printing; Manufacture of coke, and refined petroleum products; Manufacture of 
chemicals and chemical products; Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations; Manufacture of 
rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic mineral products; Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products, 
except machinery and equipment; Manufacture of electrical equipment; Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.; Manufacture 
of transport equipment; Manufacture of furniture; other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and equipment; Water, 
sewerage, waste management and remediation activities; Construction; Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles; Transportation and storage; Accommodation and food service activities; Telecommunications.  
 
Sectors Considered for the Product Market Regulation analysis: 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing; Mining and quarrying; Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products; Manufacture 
of textiles, wearing apparel and leather products; Manufacture of wood and paper products, and printing; Manufacture of coke, and 
refined petroleum products; Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products; Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical preparations; Manufacture of rubber and plastics products, and other non-metallic mineral products; Manufacture of 
basic metals and fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment; Manufacture of computer, electronic  and optical 
products; Manufacture of electrical equipment; Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.; Manufacture of transport equipment; 
Manufacture of furniture; other manufacturing; repair and installation of machinery and equipment; Electricity, gas, steam and air-
conditioning supply; Water, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities; Construction; Wholesale and retail trade, repair of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles; Transportation and storage; Accommodation and food service activities; Publishing, audiovisual and 
broadcasting activities; Telecommunications; Computer programming, consultancy and related activities; information service activities; 
Financial and insurance activities; Real estate activities; Legal and accounting activities; activities of head offices; management 
consultancy activities; architecture and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis; Scientific research and development; 
Advertising and market research; other professional, scientific and technical activities; veterinary activities; Administrative and support 
service activities; Public administration and defence; compulsory social security; Education; Human health services; Social work 
activities; Arts, entertainment and recreation; Other services activities. 
 
